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1. INTRODUCTION
Elliptic curves over the ring Zn were first employed by Lenstra [Len1, Len2] to
present his algorithm on factorization of integers. These curves have also been used
to construct new public-key cryptographic schemes [Dem, Koy, KMOV, Men].
Elliptic analogs of the RSA-scheme have been proposed in [Dem, Koy, KMOV],
and an elliptic analog of Rabin-type scheme has been proposed in [KMOV].
In this paper we consider the following computational problems of cryptographic
significance concerning elliptic curves over the ring Zn with n being square-free:
(1) Given an odd positive integer n, and integers a, b such that 4a2+27b3 is
prime to n, to compute the number of rational points on the elliptic curve E defined
by Y2=X 3+aX+b over Zn .
(2) Given an odd positive integer n, integers a, b with 4a2+27b3 prime to n,
and a point P=(u, v) on the elliptic curve E defined by Y2=X3+aX+b over Zn ,
where u, v # Zn , to find a rational point Q on E such that 2Q=P.
Problem (1) is the elliptic analog of computing the value of the Euler function
at n for composite n, and Problem (2) is the elliptic analog of solving quadratic
equation x2#a mod n for given n and a. These problems arise respectively in the
elliptic analogs of an RSA-scheme and a Rabin-type cryptographic scheme. In
[KMOV] a special case of Problems (1) and (2) was considered in connection to
the elliptic cryptosystems proposed therein, namely the case where n is the product
of two primes p and q with p#q#2 (mod 3) and the elliptic curves E being con-
sidered are of a special type defined by Y 2=X3+b over Zn . In that case it was
shown that factoring n is equivalent to solving either problem. In this paper we con-
sider Problems (1) and (2) in their full generality and show that both problems are
equivalent to factoring integers under random polynomial time reduction.
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Concerning the curves and groups employed in the elliptic cryptosystems, we
remark that the elliptic curves used in [Koy, KMOV] are special. On the other
hand, while the elliptic curves employed in [Dem] are general, the groups being
considered are not naturally defined. The elliptic analogs of an RSA-scheme and a
Rabin-scheme presented in this paper involve general elliptic curves over the ring
Zn , as well as naturally defined groups on the curves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some basic
facts on elliptic curves over finite rings. Based on these facts we present in Section
3 two public-key cryptosystems based on elliptic curves over the ring Zn . In Section
4 we present randomized reductions from integer factoring to Problems (1) and (2).
2. ELLIPTIC CURVES OVER THE RING Zn
We refer to the papers [Len1, Len2] for basic facts about elliptic curves over
rings. Throughout this paper we assume that n>1 is a positive integer that has no
multiple divisors and is prime to 6. Let n have the factorization
n= ‘
r
i=1
p i ,
where r1 and p1 , p2 , ..., pr are r distinct primes. For each pi we have the finite
field Fpi and its extension Fpi2 . Consider the ring
Rn :=Fp
1
2 _ } } } _Fpr2 .
Addition and multiplication of elements of Rn correspond to operations of each
coordinate in its field. Thus fields Fpi and Fpi2 are naturally injected in Rn as sub-
rings for each 1ir. At the same time the ring Zn is also naturally embedded
into Rn as a subring:
m # Zn @(m(mod p1), ..., m(mod pr)) # Rn .
An element a of R is a unit if and only if each of its coordinates is a nonzero ele-
ment. A triple (x, y, z) # R3n is called primitive if the ideal of Rn generated by x, y, z
is equal to Rn*. The unit group Rn* acts on the set of primitive triples (x, y, z) # R
3
n
by u(x, y, z)=(ux, uy, uz). The set of orbits under this action is called the projective
plane over Rn .
Let a, b be two integers such that 4a2+27b3 is prime to n. Consider the projec-
tive curve defined by
Ea, b : Y2Z=X3+aXZ2+bZ3.
This is an elliptic curve that is defined over the fields and rings
Fpi=Zpi , i=1, ..., r; Rn ; Zn .
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Its affine model is
Y2=X3+aX+b.
Ea, b is simply denoted by E when there is no danger of confusion. For a subring
S of Rn , we denote by E(S) the set of points (x, y, z) on the projective plane over
Rn with x, y, z being in S and satisfying the defining equation for E. Then E(S)
forms an abelian group with the zero element (0, 1, 0) denoted by OS . If S is a field,
then all points in E(S), except for OS , are of the form (x, y, 1). It can be shown that
E(Rn)&E(Fp21)_ } } } _E(Fp2r ), E(Zn)&E(Zp1)_ } } } _E(Zpr).
Therefore each point P of E(Zn) has a direct decomposition
P=[P( p1), ..., P( pr)]
with P( pi) # E(Zpi) for 1ir. The point P( pi) is called the projected image of P
at pi . Obviously the order of P is equal to the least common multiple of the
orders of P( p1), ..., P( pr). Write P, P( pi) into triples (x, y, z) # E(Zn) and
(xi , yi , zi) # E(Zpi), respectively. Then for 1ir one has x#xi (mod pi), y#yi
(mod pi), z#zi (mod pi). We simply denote by P#P( p i) (mod pi) these congruen-
ces. For all i, z#0 (mod pi) if and only if zi #0 (mod pi), if and only if P( pi) is
the zero element of E(Zpi). So the number of points in E(Zn) with the form (x, y, 1)
is equal to >ri=1 ( |E( pi)|&1). Another observation is that for every x # Zn there
exists an element y in Rn such that (x, y, 1) is a point in E(Rn). The explicit for-
mulas for the sum point of two points in E(Rn) can be written according to their
coordinates (see Chap. 3 of [Sil] and Section 3 of [Len2]). Here we point out that
for an integer m and a point P=(x, y, 1) # E(Rn), the X-coordinate and Z-coor-
dinate of the point m } P depend only on x and can be computed from x in
O(log(m)) applications of a recurrence formula (see Exerxise 3.7 of [Sil, Mon,
Dem]).
Finally we mention an algorithm by Schoof [Sch] to determine the number of
rational points of elliptic curves over finite fields. This is a completely deterministic
polynomial time algorithm. We call it Schoof ’s algorithm in this paper.
3. TWO PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS
In this section we describe two public-key cryptosystems based on elliptic curves
over Zn . The security of both schemes depends on the factorization of the integer n.
For both schemes we select two big primes p and q, and let n= pq denote the
arithmetic modulus. Select an elliptic curve Ea, b with the parameters a and b
satisfying gcd(4a2+27b3, n)=1.
Scheme 1: RSA-type Scheme
The user computes the number N=|Ea, b (Rn)| by computing |Ea, b (Fp2)| and
|Ea, b (Fq2)|, respectively, from the Schoof ’s algorithm, and multiplying them. He
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chooses a number e for encryption key and computes the decryption key d, where
ed#1 (mod N).
Encryption. We know that each integer (mod n) occurs as the X-coordinate of
a point in E(Rn). The message m # Zn is taken to be the X-coordinate of a point
P=(m, v, 1) # E(Rn). Then the X-coordinate of the point eP over Zn is sent. Note
that v does not need to be computed and, as discussed before, the X-coordinate of
the point eP is in Zn and can be computed from m in O(log e) modular arithmetic
operations.
Decryption. Upon receiving the X-part of Q=eP, compute the X-coordinate of
dQ, which should be m. By the previous section, the projected image of dQ mod p
and q should be the projected image of edP, i.e., P=dQ # E(Zn).
Remark. It is clear that the system is breakable if |E(Rn)| can be computed
efficiently. As described above, |E(Rn)| can be computed efficiently once n is
factored. On the other hand, we will show in Section 4 that if |E(Rn)| or |E(Zn)|
can be computed in random polynomial time for all E, then n can be factored in
random polynomial time.
Scheme 2: Rabin-type Scheme
For this scheme, a, b are chosen such that both |Ea, b (Fp2)| and |Ea, b (Fq2)| are
odd, so that the solution of the equation 2X=Q, where Q=2P, is unique in E(Rn).
This can be done by choosing a, b such that x3+ax+b is irreducible over Fp2
and Fq2 .
The encryption and decryption of this scheme is similar to those of Scheme 1, but
we send the X-coordinate of Q=2P instead. The user then solves 2X=Q over Fp2
and Fq2 to find X-coordinates of P( p) and P(q). Then we retrieve P by the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
Remark. It is also obvious that this scheme is breakable once n is factored.
Scheme 2 is based on the difficulty of solving quadratic equations for elliptic curves
over Zn . It will be shown in Section 4 that this is also equivelent to factoring n
under a random polynomial time reduction.
4. RANDOMIZED REDUCTIONS FROM INTEGER FACTORIZATION
It is easy to see that both Problems (1) and (2) can be reduced to integer
factoring in random polynomial time (see, e.g. [KMOV]). Hence to show that the
two problems are equivalent to integer factoring, it is sufficient to give random
polynomial time reductions from integer factoring to them.
For a prime p different from 2 and 3, let Sp be the set
Sp=[(a, b) # Zp_Zp | 4a2+27b30 (mod p)].
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Then the cardinality of Sp equals p2& p. Consider another set
Tp=[(a, b) # Sp | x3+ax+b has at least one root in Zp].
Note the fact that the condition 4a2+27b30 (mod p) is equivalent to the fact that
x3+ax+b has no multiple roots in Zp ; one can easily show that the cardinality
of Tp is (4p2&5p+1)6. Observe that the order |Ea, b (Zp)| of Ea, b (Zp) is even
if and only if (a, b) is in Tp . Thus if we pick two integers a, b randomly, then the
probability that Ea, b is an elliptic curve over Zp and |Ea, b (Zp)| is even is equal
(4p2&5p+1)(6p2), that is approximately equal to 23 when p is sufficiently large.
Suppose that E is an elliptic curve over Zp and |E(Zp)| is even. Then for a
randomly chosen point P in E(Zp), the probability that P has even order in E(Zp)
is at least 12. From the above analysis we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let p be a prime different from 2 and 3. Then for randomly chosen
integers a, b and a point P in Ea, b (Zp), we have the following:
(1) The probability that P has even order is at least (4p2&5p+1)(12p2) that
is asymptotically equal to 13.
(2) The probability that P has odd order is at least (2p2& p&1)(6p2) which
is also asymptotically equal to 13.
Lemma 2. Let n=>ri=1 pi be an integer with (6, n)=1 and r2 and let p be the
smallest prime divisor of n. Pick two integers a, b and a point P in E(Zn) randomly.
Then for any two distinct prime divisors q, e of n, the probability that one of P(q) and
P(e) has odd order and the other has even order is at least
2
9
&
7
18p
.
Proposition 3. Let n=>ri=1 p i be a composite, i.e., r2. Let R be a ring
containing the ring Zn . If counting points on elliptic curves over R can be solved in
random polynomial time, then factoring n can be done in random polynomial time.
Proof. Pick randomly integers a, x, y (mod n) and put b= y2&x3&ax
(mod n). Consider the elliptic curve E : Y2=X3+aX+b and the point P=
(x, y, 1) # E(Zn)E(R). We may assume that 4a2+27b3 is prime to n; otherwise n
is factored.
Let p, q be two distinct prime divisors of n and p be the least prime divisor of
n. Then with probability at least 29&7(18p), one of P( p) and P(q) has even order
and the other has odd order. Suppose this is the case and say that P( p) has odd
order, while P(q) has even order. Then E(R) is of even order. Write |E(R)|=2sm
with m odd. Then m } P( p) is the zero element of E(Zp), and m } P(q) is not the
zero element of E(Zq). This means that the Z-coordinate z of m } P satisfies z#0
(mod p) and z0 (mod q). Computing gcd(z, n), we have factored n.
Proposition 4. Let n=>ri=1 pi be a composite, i.e., r2. Then factoring n can
be done in random polynomial time if the following problem can be solved in random
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polynomial time: given an elliptic curve E over Zn and a rational point Q on E, to find
a rational point P such that 2P=Q on E.
Proof. Let p and q be two distinct prime divisors of n.
Pick randomly two integers x, y (mod n) with x prime to n. Otherwise n is
factored. Put a=x2& y2x and consider E: Y2=X(X2&a). Then E has at least two
2-torsion points being Zn -rational and P=(x, y, 1) is a point in E(Zn). Put Q=2P
and solve 2X=Q on E. Then, since our solution X is a ‘random half’ of Q, with
probability at least 14, X and P have the same projection on one of E(Zp) and
E(Zq), but are different on the other. This means that one of X( p)&P( p) and
X(q)&P(q) is the zero element and the other is not. Again this means that the
Z-coordinate of X&P is divisible by one of p, q but not the other, and n splits as
a result.
While the number of rational points on an elliptic curve over a finite field can be
computed in polynomial time using, for example, Schoof’s algorithm, Proposition
3 implies that computing the number of rational points on elliptic curves over the
ring Zn , where n is composite, is equivalent to factoring n. In fact it seems unlikely
that a polynomial time algorithm such as Schoof’s algorithm can be used to extract
information about the number of rational points on an elliptic curve over the ring
Zn . We argue below that if there is a polynomial time algorithm A which computes
some m divisible by |Ea, b (Zn)| with probability at least 1logc (n) for randomly
chosen a and b, then the following algorithm can be used to split n in random poly-
nomial time. The algorithm is divided into four steps.
Step 1. Input n. Pick up randomly three integers a, x, y and put b#
y2&x3&ax (mod n).
Step 2. Apply Algorithm A on Ea, b . If it outputs an integer m, go to Step 3.
Otherwise stop the algorithm.
Step 3. Compute m } P. If m } P=O # Ea, b (Zn), go to Step 4. Otherwise stop the
algorithm.
Step 4. Write m in the form 2su with (u, 2)=1. Compute the Z-coordinate z of
the point u } P and gcd(n, z).
We argue below that the above algorithm splits n in random polynomial time,
assuming the existence of Algorithm A.
Let p be the smallest prime divisor of n. Let q be another prime divisor of n.
By Lemma 2 and the property of Algorithm A, with probability at least
(29&7(18p))(1logc n), one of P( p) and P(q) has odd order and the other has
even order, and that Algorithm A on input n, a, b computes an integer m divisible
by |Ea, b (Zn)|. Suppose that this is the case and write E for Ea, b . We may assume
that P( p) is of odd order in Ea, b (Zp) and P(q) is of even order in E(Zq). Since the
order of P(q) is even and the order of P( p) is odd, u } P(q) is not the zero element
in E(Zq) and P( p) is the zero element in E(Zp), i.e., the Z-coordinate of P satisfies
z0 (mod q) and z#0 (mod p). Therefore, pgcd(z, n)<n is a divisor of n.
It is also possible to reduce factoring a composite n to computing |E(Zn)| for
special types of elliptic curves E. This was done in [KMOV] for n= pq, where p, q
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are primes with p#q#2 (mod 3) and E is of the form y2=x3+b. We show below
that for integers n consisting of distinct odd primes p and q, one can in fact reduce
factoring integers n to computing |E(Zn)| for any elliptic curve E, as long as |E(Zn)|
is even. This includes, for example, curves of the form Y2=(X&d )(X2+dX+e), in
addition to the special case in [KMOV].
For the reduction, suppose that |E(Zn)| is even. Since an elliptic curve over Zp
has at least p+1&2 - p rational points for prime p, a random integer x (mod p)
is the X-coordinate of a rational point of the curve with probability
( p+1&2 - p)2p>14 when p>16. Without loss of generality, assume that p and
q are greater than 16. Then with probability at least 116, a random integer x
(mod n) is the X-coordinate of a point P=(x, y, 1) # E(Zn). We cannot afford to solve
y explicitly, however, as noted in Section 2, for any integer m, the X-coordinate and
the Z-coordinate of m } P can be calculated from x with O(log m) applications of a
recurrence formula. This will be sufficient for our purposes.
Recall that the group of rational points of an elliptic curve over a finite field has
at most two components. Hence we may assume without loss of generality that the
largest components of |E(Zp)| and |E(Zq)| are of order 2s1u1 and 2s2u2 , respec-
tively, with u1 , u2 odd and s1s2 . Then s11 and 2E(Zp) is a proper subgroup
of E(Zp), and with probability at least 12 a random element of E(Zp) is not in
2E(Zp). On the other hand, with probability at least 14 (since there at most four
rational 2-torsion points) a random element of E(Zq) is in 2E(Zq). Hence with
probability at least 18, a random element P # E(Zn) has the property that
P( p)  2E(Zp) and P(q) # 2E(Zq). Therefore for a random integer x (mod n), with
probability at least 1128, x is the X-coordinate of some P=(x, y, 1) # E(Zn),
P( p)  2E(Zp), and P(q) # 2E(Zq). Suppose this is the case and let m=2s1&1u1u2 .
Then m } P(q) is the zero element of E(Zq), and m } P( p) is not the zero element of
E(Zp). Hence, the Z-coordinate z of m } P satisfies z#0 (mod q) and z0 (mod p),
so gcd(z, n) is either p or q. However, s1 is not known to us. Instead, let
|E(Zn)|=2su with u odd. Then ss1 , and by computing gcd(z i , n), where z i is the
Z-coordinate of (2iu) } P for i=0,..., s&1, we have factored n.
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